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I
By
On October 13, 2011, the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance quietly issued
new guidance (Guidance) describing
disclosures of cybersecurity incidents and
attacks and the prevention and remediation measures that public companies
(Registrants) have suffered or may suffer,
and of the prevention and remediation
expenses they have expended or may
expend
No.

_

_

. This Guidance is

not a rule or regulation or a commission
interpretation. It did not appear in the Federal Register for comment or otherwise.
Its issuance is likely to cause substantial
amounts of work among Registrants and
legal professionals who represent them. At
the very least, the Guidance brings new attention to cybersecurity issues in Registrants' operations and disclosures.
This Guidance appears to result from an
exchange of letters between Senator John
D. Rockefeller IV and SEC Chairman
Mary Schapiro. Senator Rockefeller's
May 11, 2011, letter noted the "growing
threat and the national security and economic ramifications of successful attacks
against American businesses," declared
it "essential" that corporate executives
"know their responsibility for managing
and disclosing information security risk,"
and requested the SEC to issue guidance
"regarding the disclosure of information
security risk, including material network
breaches." Chairman Schapiro responded
on June 6, 2011, reciting a number of dis-
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and
closure requirements imposed on Registrants under the federal securities laws and
pointing out that certain of these requirements might obligate a Registrant to make
cybersecurity disclosures:
For example, Item 503(c) of Regulation
S-K may require risk factor disclosure regarding a prior cyber attack, a
potential cyber attack, or the effects of
a cyber attack.... Thus, a company
should consider whether cyber attacks
and vulnerabilities present specific and
material risks and should avoid generic
risk factor disclosure that could apply to
any company.
Chairman Schapiro explained, however,
that she had asked the commission staff
to provide her with a briefing on "current
disclosure practices" and to advise her on
"whether additional guidance is needed
to make sure investors have access to the
information they need when making their
investment decisions."
The resulting Guidance lays out six
aspects of disclosures that may be affected
by cyber attacks and prevention and remediation expenses. However, it gives only
passing attention to the trade-off inherent
in making Registrants' cybersecurity risks
and prevention measures more transparent. The trade-off can be summarized
as follows: The more revealing a Registrant's cybersecurity disclosures become,
the greater the likelihood that they will
provide information useful to hackers and

competitors (Adversaries). Specifically,
a Registrant's cybersecurity disclosures,
which the longstanding SEC interpretations require be specific to the Registrant
rather than generic, will be understood
far better by a cyber Adversary, than by a
potential investor, and, accordingly, more
valuable to Adversaries.
The goal of this article is to arm Business Law Today readers with the basics
about the Guidance so that they can have
conversations with clients who are or
are about to be Registrants, about what
this new Guidance requires in responsive
disclosures and revisions to disclosure
controls and procedures. The article also
expresses concerns that, notwithstanding
the SEC's staff's expressed intentions to
the contrary, the greater transparency in
Registrants' post-Guidance disclosures
may provide roadmaps for cyber attacks
and thefts.
The Guidance acknowledges that "no
existing disclosure requirement explicitly
refers to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents," but then advises that "a number
of disclosure requirements may impose an
obligation on Registrants to disclose such
risks and incidents." The Guidance further
notes that disclosure of cybersecurity risks
and cyber incidents might be required in
order to "make other required disclosures
... not misleading" when made. SEC staff

also cautions that "Registrants should
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review, on an ongoing basis, the adequacy
of their disclosure relating to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents." The
obligations thus created pose potentially
burdensome tasks for Registrants.

Cyber risks and costs fall within the "risks
and events" that may affect the accuracy,
timeliness and completeness of required
disclosures. The Guidance cites obligations to keep shelf registration statements
up to date, the over-arching responsibility
to disclose material information (pursuant to Securities Act Rule 408, Exchange
Act Rule 12b-20, and Exchange Act Rule
14a-9), and the antifraud provisions of
Securities Act Section 17(a), Exchange
Act Section 10(b), and Exchange Act
Rule 10b-5, in support of responsibilities
to review and disclose cyber risks and
incidents so that their disclosures are not
misleading to investors.

The new Guidance sets forth six aspects
of Registrants' disclosure duties under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange
Act of 1934 and related SEC rules:

To the extent that they are "among the
most significant factors that make an
investment in the [registrant] speculative
or risky," the Guidance requires disclosure
of the risk of cyber incidents affecting the
registrant. It recommends that Registrants,
in determining "whether risk factor disclosure is required," assess their own cybersecurity risks considering all "relevant
information, including prior incidents, the
severity and frequency of those incidents"
from quantitative and qualitative perspectives, and the "costs and consequences resulting from misappropriation of assets or
sensitive information, corruption of data
or operational disruption." Registrants
also should "consider the adequacy of preventative actions taken to reduce cybersecurity risks" from the perspective of the
industry in which the registrant operates,
including "threatened attacks of which
[the individual registrant] is cognizant."
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Risk factor disclosures should cover
the nature of "material risks" and should
describe how specific risks might affect
the registrant as contextually as possible,
avoiding risks and effects that are generic
(as SEC Regulation S-K requires). The
Guidance suggests "appropriate [risk factor] disclosures" as follows:
1. Discussion of aspects of the registrant's business or operations that give
rise to material cybersecurity risks and
their potential costs and consequences;
2. To the extent the registrant outsources
functions that have material cybersecurity risks, description of those functions and how the registrant addresses
those risks;
3. Description of cyber incidents experienced by the registrant that are individually, or in the aggregate, material,
including their costs and consequences;
4. Risks related to cyber incidents that
may remain undetected for an extended
period; and
5. Description of the registrant's cyber
event insurance coverage.

Risks and incidents should be disclosed
(pursuant to SEC Regulation S-K and
Form 20-F, respectively) if costs and
consequences of known or potential cyber
incidents would constitute "a material
event, trend, or uncertainty that is reasonably likely to have a material effect on
results of operations, liquidity or financial
condition" or to cause reports not necessarily to indicate future operating results
or financial condition. Examples include:
disclosure of how a theft of intellectual
property would affect the registrant's
stated results of operations, or reduce
revenues, or, in the absence of a loss of intellectual property, of how an event would
cause a material increase in cybersecurity
prevention or remediation costs, including
litigation costs.
Registrants must disclose (again pursuant to Regulation S-K and Form 20-F,
respectively) the effect of one or more

cyber incidents on its products, services,
relationships with customers or suppliers, or on competitive conditions if any
would materially affect any reportable
segment(s) of their businesses. The staff's
example concerns knowledge of a cyber
event that could affect materially a forthcoming product's future viability.

If a Registrant or any subsidiary has a
pending legal proceeding pertaining to
a cyber incident whose outcome would
affect its prospects, it should disclose the
proceeding(s) pursuant to Regulation S-K.
For example, if a "significant amount of
customer information" had been stolen,
the Registrant should disclose the court,
the date the action commenced, the principal parties to the action, the factual basis
for the action, and relief sought.

The nature and potential severity of cyber
incidents a Registrant may have can affects its financial statements in material
ways according to standards adopted by
Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB). The SEC staff's Guidance
suggests a time-bifurcated analysis and
disclosure:
Prior to an Incident. The FASB Ac-

counting Standards Codification (ASC) on
Internal-Use Software requires capitalization
costs for cyber prevention to be disclosed.
During and Following an Incident.

Disclosures during and following a cyber
incident fall into four categories regulated
by specific FASB guidance:
* Customer Payments and Incentive

requires "appropriate recognition,
measurement, and classification of
these payments used to mitigate cyberincident damages."
* Loss~ Continge~nciesrequires determi-

nation-and recognition of-liabilities
from asserted and un-asserted claims
such as related to warranties, breach of
contract, recalls and replacement, and
counter-party indemnification of remediation expenses. If these expenses
and claims are probable and reason-

Published in Business Law Today, December 2011. @2011 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any
portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written
consent of the American Bar Association.

2

Business Law TODAY
ably estimable, Registrants should
disclose them. Additionally, the SEC
Staff Guidance requires Registrants to
disclose losses that are "at least reasonably possible."
* Risks and Uncertainties,requires disclosures of effects of cyber incidents
that would diminish future cash flows
because of impairment of intangible
assets such as goodwill and other
customer-related intangibles including allowances for product returns,
trademarks, patents, etc. Post-event estimates and subsequent reassessments
enable a Registrant to explain risks or
uncertainties of "a reasonably possible change" in near-term estimates
that could be material to its financial
statements.
* Subsequent Events may require disclosures if incidents, recognized or nonrecognized, occur or are discovered
after a balance sheet date but before
the associated financial statements are
issued. Financial statements should
disclose "material non-recognized
subsequent" events in terms of their
nature and an estimate of their "financial effect, or a statement that such an
estimate cannot be made."

The SEC staff Guidance also requires
Registrants to disclose the effectiveness of
their Disclosure Controls and Procedures
to the extent that they affect the Registrant's ability to "record, process, summarize, and report" information that they
should disclose in SEC filings. In addition,
Registrants should evaluate and disclose
deficiencies in controls and procedures
if a cyber incident would cause information not to be recorded "properly" and,
therefore, would render disclosures to be
"ineffective." (SEC Regulation S-K and
Form 20-F.)

Cybersecurity specialists acknowledge a
simple truth: attackers need to find only
one gap in an enterprise's defenses. Registrants, in contrast, must plug and seal
every gap to remain protected. As a result,
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cybersecurity specialists would have five
concerns about the Guidance:
1. Registrants may begin complying
with the Guidance cautiously, adding
cyber risks to pre-existing lists of risks
and describing them in terms that are too
minimal and vague to be of much use to
potential investors.
The Guidance creates new burdens for
Registrants, the most significant of which
will probably be to craft disclosures to
enable a Registrant to comply with the
Guidance without revealing any information of use to an Adversary. It may help
Registrants to recall that division staff
admits that they are mindful that "detailed
disclosures could compromise cybersecurity efforts" and that "disclosures of that
nature are not required under the federal
securities laws." If the staff notifies Registrants of deficiencies in their cybersecurity disclosures, many Registrants may
respond by defending the deficiency as
avoiding the kind of disclosure that could
compromise cybersecurity and justify it
further by reminding the Staff of their
position that such disclosures are "not
required" by federal securities laws.
2. Cautious, minimal and vague disclosures, as noted above, are likely to help
Registrants' adversaries before they will
become useful for investors.
The Guidance likely will have the
unintended consequence of encouraging
increased investment in obtaining legal
advice on finding the words to express
cybersecurity disclosures that will satisfy
the staff without informing the Adversary.
If a Registrant has to choose between
complying with the Guidance and sapping
its cybersecurity, the choice is clear: It
will avoid compromising the enterprise.
The division should not have put Registrants into the bind of having to make such
choices, and should not be surprised when
Registrants choose to make less informative disclosures. The Staff can then object,
and a Registrant can point out to the staff
the risks that the staff's comments may
well have overlooked or underestimated.
3. The Guidance calls for certain kinds
of information to be disclosed that, if
disclosed in detail or with any significant
detail or specificity, would likely under-

mine cyber security.
A closer look at the bullet point list of
"risk factor" disclosures reveals a tension
between the Guidance's aims and its disclosure requirements, some of which, as
explained above, would provide potentially valuable intelligence to a Registrant's
Adversary. A Registrant that, as directed,
disclosed "risks related to cyber incidents that may remain undetected for an
extended period" could identify itself as
a vulnerable target to Adversaries. To explain such risks without highlighting them
for an Adversary would appear impossible except through use of obscure and
ambiguously phrased disclosures. Similar
problems would arise for a Registrant trying to discuss aspects of its operations that
"give rise to material cybersecurity risks".
The staff may have seriously underestimated the skills of Adversaries.
4. If a cyber attack should follow a
compliant disclosure, what is the likelihood
that a shareholder's derivative suit against
officers and directors would succeed?
Registrants should not be pushed by a
disclosure requirement to decide between
compliance with a staff interpretation and
facilitating an attack on themselves that
could expose not only the enterprise's
assets to damage or loss, but that could
expose officers and directors to costly and
wasteful lawsuits.
5. The Guidance apparently marks
the beginning, not the end, of the SEC's
efforts to influence Registrants' cybersecurity. As revealed in testimony by Robert
Cook, Director, Division of Trading and
Markets (TM) before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Subcommittee on Securities,
Insurance, and Investment, on November
16, 2011,
TM plans to enhance its ARP [Automation Review Policies] reviews, with a
particular focus on whether registered
entities have appropriate cybersecurity
measures, and is preparing recommendations for the Commission to further
strengthen the ARP standards.

The Guidance required disclosures that
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have the result of making Registrants
more accountable for cybersecurity lapses
and failings. The TM plans would go further and apparently set standards for registered entities for "appropriate cybersecurity measures." In light of the unintended
consequences of the Staff's Guidance, it
seems premature and ill-advised for the
SEC to be considering going even further
and prescribing cybersecurity standards.

The new cybersecurity Guidance from
the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance
recognizes the centrality of technology to
Registrants' operations and profitability,
the risks that cyber-attacks present to both,
and the resulting relevance of cybersecurity measures. As Deputy Secretary of
Defense William J. Lynn observed in "Defending a New Domain," Foreign Affairs

(Sept./Oct. 2010):
Modem information technology also
increases the risk of industrial espionage
and the theft of commercial information.
... Every year, an amount of intellec-

tual property many times larger than all
the intellectual property contained in
the Library of Congress is stolen from
networks maintained by U.S. businesses,
universities, and government agencies.
The Guidance's requirement that a
Registrant disclose specific material information concerning their cybersecurity
condition, preparedness, and experience
with cyber attacks may create a Hobbesian choice for Registrants: If Registrants'
disclosures contain sufficient information
to be meaningful for investors, disclosures
almost certainly will have to contain information of value to Adversaries seeking
reconnaissance data that will facilitate a
breach or enhance its ability to exploit a
cyber-vulnerability. As a result, Registrants may want to ensure that they avoid
disclosures that would reveal information
of particular benefit to Adversaries while,
at the same time, investing in measures to
improve their cybersecurity, their detection of cyber attacks, and their speed of
recovery from cyber incidents.
It may be that the Guidance will achieve
its purpose and provide investors with
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material information that, prior to its
release, Registrants had been reluctant
to disclose, had not believed they were
obligated to disclose, and, therefore, had
refrained from disclosing. It also may be
that, under the obligation to disclose such
information, Registrants will be motivated to improve cybersecurity in order to
avoid finding themselves in the position
where their experience of a cyber attack
obligates them, under the Guidance, to
disclose information that would make
them less attractive to investors. However
close the Guidance comes to achieving
such results, it also may put Registrants
in a double-bind. As Tom Smedinghoff,
partner in the Privacy & Data Protection
practice at Edwards Wildman, observes:
If a Registrant conducts a risk assessment and finds cybersecurity deficiencies that are sufficiently material to
require disclosure in its SEC filings, the
registrant's legal obligations to provide 'reasonable' or 'appropriate' data
security under other applicable federal
or state laws will likely also require that
it take appropriate steps to address those
deficiencies. Thus, in some cases, disclosing cybersecurity risks may prompt
inquiry regarding compliance with
applicable data security laws, and may
increase the risk of potential liability
for failure to provide legally required
security. It may well be a 'catch-22' for
the Registrant.
Registrants and their lawyers will not
know, for a while at least, what the precise
consequences of the new Guidance, intended and otherwise, will be. It also may
take time for the SEC staff to discover
how much value investors will gain from
the required cybersecurity disclosures, or
whether, as we fear, the earliest beneficiaries and the ones who stand the most to
gain will be Adversaries, not investors. We
hope that experience under the Guidance
will not meet our most pessimistic predictions, but rather will motivate appropriate
additional attention to cybersecurity.
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